Constitutional Constraints

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Constitutional Constraints

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Title: Constitutional Constraints
Author: Fallon, Richard Henry
Citation: Richard H. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975 (2009).
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Abstract: The main ambition of "Constitutional Constraints" is to open up the subject of constitutional constraints on government officials, including Presidents and Supreme Court Justices, as a topic for discussion within the field of Constitutional Theory. The subject has so far received little comprehensive discussion in the law reviews, in part because of a division between scholarly approaches that treat constitutional law as a system of norms and political scientific theories that portray judges and other officials as constrained maximizers of personal goals or preferences. This Article attempts to incorporate the central insights of both approaches and to identify the important, frequently unappreciated ways in which they frequently reinforce on another.
Published Version: http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/97-4/09Aug_Fallon.pdf
Other Sources: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=californialawreview
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11222676
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