The Core Of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review

DSpace/Manakin Repository

The Core Of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: The Core Of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review
Author: Fallon, Richard Henry
Citation: Richard H. Fallon, The Core Of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008).
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: The best case for judicial review in politically and morally healthy societies does not depend (as is commonly believed) on the idea that courts are more likely than legislatures to define vague rights correctly. It rests instead on the subtly different ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted to protect fundamental rights and, accordingly, that both should have veto powers over legislation that might reasonably be thought to violate such rights.

In developing this case for judicial review, Professor Fallon proceeds by confronting recent, influential, philosophically probing arguments against judicial review by Professor Jeremy Waldron. Professor Fallon concedes arguendo that, as Professor Waldron argues, courts are no better than legislatures at defining rights correctly, but maintains that the crucial question is not whether courts or legislatures are less likely to err, but which kinds of errors are most important to avoid — those that result in rights being overprotected or those that result in rights being infringed. Insofar as judicial review can be designed to prevent errors in just one direction, involving failures to protect rights adequately, then judicial review may be supportable even if courts are no better than legislatures at identifying rights correctly. Professor Fallon also argues, contra Professor Waldron, that judicial review can actually contribute to the political legitimacy of an otherwise democratic scheme of government when the demands of political legitimacy are understood correctly.

Professor Fallon’s revised justification for judicial review, which does not presume courts to be better than legislatures at identifying fundamental rights, has important implications for how judicial review should be practiced. It implies a diminished role for courts in cases in which fundamental rights are pitted against one another, such that the overenforcement of one entails the underenforcement of the other. It also implies that courts should withhold review when legislatures conscientiously seek to protect one fundamental right without plausibly threatening another.
Published Version: http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/fallon_judicialreview.pdf
Other Sources: http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2087.1/Cross/fn149.fallon.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11222677
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters