Divide and Conquer

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Divide and Conquer

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Title: Divide and Conquer
Author: Posner, Eric A.; Spier, Kathryn E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer, 2 J. Legal Analysis 417 (2010).
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Abstract: The maxim “divide and conquer” (divide et impera) is invoked frequently in law, history, and politics, but often in a loose or undertheorized way. We suggest that the maxim is a placeholder for a complex of ideas related by a family resemblance, but differing in their details, mechanisms and implications. We provide an analytic taxonomy of divide and conquer mechanisms in the settings of a Stag Hunt Game and an indefinitely-repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. A number of applications are considered, including labor law, bankruptcy, constitutional design and the separation of powers, imperialism and race relations, international law, litigation and settlement, and antitrust law. Conditions under which divide and conquer strategies reduce or enhance social welfare, and techniques that policy makers can use to combat divide and conquer tactics, are also discussed.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jla/2.2.417
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414319
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11225151
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