Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment

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Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment

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Title: Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment
Author: Ramanna, Karthik; Watts, Ross L.

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Citation: Ramanna, Karthik, and Ross L. Watts. "Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment." Review of Accounting Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2012).
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Abstract: SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine goodwill write-offs. In promulgating the standard, the FASB predicted managers will, on average, use the fair value estimates to convey private information on future cash flows. The current fair value of goodwill is unverifiable because it depends in part on management's future actions (including managers' conceptualization and implementation of firm strategy). Thus, agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use the discretion in SFAS 142 consistent with private incentives. We test these hypotheses in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while consistent with some agency-theory derived predictions, does not confirm the private information hypothesis.
Published Version: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11142-012-9188-5
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11320612
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