Excess-Pay Clawbacks

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Excess-Pay Clawbacks

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Title: Excess-Pay Clawbacks
Author: Fried, Jesse M.; Shilon, Nitzan

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Citation: Jesse M. Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. Corp. L. 721 (2011).
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Abstract: We explain why firms should have a policy requiring directors to recover “excess pay” – payouts to executives resulting from an error in compensation metrics (such as inflated earnings). We then analyze the clawback policies voluntarily adopted by S&P 500 firms as of 2010 and find that only a small fraction had such a policy. Our findings suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires firms to adopt a clawback policy for certain types of excess pay, will improve compensation arrangements at most firms. We also suggest how the types of excess pay not reached by Dodd-Frank should be addressed.
Published Version: http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/jcl/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/A1-Fried-Final.pdf
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1798185
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11339413
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