The Costs of Entrenched Boards

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The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Show simple item record Bebchuk, Lucian Arye Cohen, Alma 2013-12-04T14:33:21Z 2005
dc.identifier.citation Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin. Econ. 409 (2005). en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0304-405X en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, an economically significant reduction in firm value. Finally, the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend). en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.relation.isversionof en_US
dc.relation.hasversion en_US
dc.relation.hasversion en_US
dc.relation.hasversion en_US
dc.relation.hasversion en_US
dash.license META_ONLY
dc.title The Costs of Entrenched Boards en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Financial Economics en_US Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
dash.embargo.until 10000-01-01

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