The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John Wilcox

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Coates, John; Subramanian, Guhan

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye HARVARD

Coates, John HARVARD

Subramanian, Guhan HARVARD

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Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John Wilcox, 11 Corp. Governance Advisor 17 (2003).

Abstract

In recent work, we presented evidence indicating that staggered boards have adverse effects on target shareholders. John Wilcox, the Vice-Chair of Georgeson, recently published a critique of our work, urging shareholders to support staggered boards. We respond in this article to Wilcox's critique and explain why it does not weaken in any way our analysis of staggered boards.

The study criticized by Wilcox, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," 54 Stanford Law Review 887-951 (2002), is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304388. In a separate reply, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants," 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002), which is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=360840, we respond to several other responses to our original study and present additional evidence that confirms its conclusions.