One Europe, One Vote?: The Political Economy of European Union Representation in International Organizations

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One Europe, One Vote?: The Political Economy of European Union Representation in International Organizations

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Title: One Europe, One Vote?: The Political Economy of European Union Representation in International Organizations
Author: Frieden, Jeffry
Citation: Frieden, Jeffry. 2004. One Europe, one vote? The political economy of European Union representation in international organizations. European Union Politics 5(2): 261-276.
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Abstract: Many Europeans support common European Union (EU) representation in international institutions. But such a pooling of international political influence raises complex and controversial issues. A common European foreign policy position implies compromise among EU members. The pooling of international representation thus requires, as with many internal EU policies, that member states weigh the potential benefits of a common policy against the potential costs of a policy not to their liking. There can be a trade-off between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences. Simple spatial models help to make this point, to clarify the circumstances in which a common European international representation is most likely, and to explain who is most likely to support or oppose a pooling of European foreign policies.
Published Version: doi:10.1177/1465116504042441
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11379967
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