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dc.contributor.authorGilchrist, Duncan Sheppard
dc.contributor.authorLuca, Michael
dc.contributor.authorMalhotra, Deepak
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-27T18:13:41Z
dc.date.issued2016-09-01
dc.identifier.citationGilchrist, Duncan S., Michael Luca, and Deepak Malhotra. "When 3+1>4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field." Management Science 62, no. 9 (September 2016). (Originally Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-030, September 2013. Revised November 2013.)en_US
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11591699
dc.description.abstractDo higher wages elicit reciprocity and hence higher effort? In a field experiment with 266 employees, we find that paying above-market wages, per se, does not have an effect on effort relative to paying market wages. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a clear and unexpected gift (by offering a raise with no further conditions after the employee has accepted the contract – with no future employment) does lead to higher effort for the duration of the job. Targeted gifts are more efficient than hiring more workers. However, the mechanism makes this unlikely to explain persistent above-market wages.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2275
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleWhen 3+1 > 4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Fielden_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.typejournal article
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Business School working paper series # 14-030en_US
dc.relation.journalManagement Science
dash.depositing.authorLuca, Michael
dc.date.available2014-01-27T18:13:41Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2015.2275*
dash.contributor.affiliatedGilchrist, Duncan
dash.contributor.affiliatedLuca, Michael
dash.contributor.affiliatedMalhotra, Deepak


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