Truthful Prioritization Schemes for Spectrum Sharing

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https://doi.org/10.1109/infcomw.2012.6193489Metadata
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Shnayder, Victor, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, and Vikas Kawadia. 2012. Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation (NetEcon'12, at IEEE INFOCOM '12), 25-30 March 2012, Orlando, FL, 196-201. IEEE.Abstract
As the rapid expansion of smart phones and associated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see renewed interest in dynamic prioritization schemes as a way to increase the total utility of a heterogeneous user base, with each user experiencing variable demand and value for access. We adapt a recent sampled-based mechanism for resource allocation to this setting, which is more effective in aligning incentives in a setting with variable demand than an earlier method for pricing network resources due to Varian and Mackie-Mason (1994). Complementing our theoretical analysis, which also considers incentives on the sell-side of the market, we present the results of a simulation study, confirming the effectiveness of our protocol in aligning incentives and boosting welfare.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAPCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11956913
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