Legal Origins, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement
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CitationHolger Spamann, Legal Origins, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement, 166 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 149 (2010).
AbstractThis paper empirically compares civil procedure in common-law and civil-law countries. Using World-Bank and hand-collected data, and unlike earlier studies that used predecessor data sets, this paper finds no systematic differences between common- and civil-law countries in the complexity, formalism, duration, or cost of procedure in courts of first instance. The paper further finds that by a subjective measure, contract enforceability in common-law countries is higher than in French, but lower than in German and Scandinavian, civil-law countries. Given civil procedure's central role for the common-civil-law distinction, these findings challenge the distinction's economic relevance.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12025612
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