Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?

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Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?

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Title: Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?
Author: Shavell, Steven
Citation: Steven M. Shavell, Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?, 95 Econ. Letters 394 (2007).
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Abstract: Overly strict legal standards are commonly thought to discourage parties from engaging in socially desirable activities. It is explained here, however, that excessive legal standards cannot lead to undesirable curtailment of activities when legal standards are enforced by liability for negligence, essentially because parties can choose to be negligent rather than comply. But excessive legal standards can lead to undesirable reduction of activities when adherence to the standards is required by the regulatory system.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.013
Other Sources: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/ShavellDoExcessiveLegalStandardsDiscourageDesirableActivity.pdf
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921423
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12027788
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