An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game
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Iyer, Swami
Reyes, Joshua
Killingback, Timothy
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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0093988Metadata
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Iyer, Swami, Joshua Reyes, and Timothy Killingback. 2014. “An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game.” PLoS ONE 9 (4): e93988. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0093988.Abstract
The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.Other Sources
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3977969/pdf/Terms of Use
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