Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules
Author: Spier, Kathryn E.
Citation: Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. Econ. 197 (1994).
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or ''fee-shifting'' rules, provide powerful incentives for settlement. Within the context of a direct-revelation mechanism, the fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court's award to the pretrial announcements. This mechanism resembles Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other offer-based rules. In a simple extensive-form game, if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages (probability of prevailing), then Rule 68 increases (decreases) the settlement rate.
Published Version: doi:10.2307/2555827
Other Sources: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555827
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12187120
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters