Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles

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Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles

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Title: Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles
Author: Kaplow, Louis; Shavell, Steven

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Citation: Louis Kaplow & Steven M. Shavell, Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles, 20 Econ. & Phil. 209 (2004).
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Abstract: In Fairness versus Welfare (FVW), we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed entirely with regard to their effects on individuals' well-being. That is, no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness such as corrective or retributive justice or other deontological principles. Our claim is based on the demonstration that pursuit of notions of fairness has perverse effects on welfare, on other problematic aspects of the notions, and on a reconciliation of our thesis with the evident appeal of moral intuitions. Here we summarize our three arguments and explain that Professor Ripstein's commentary largely fails to respond to them. (We will pass over some of what he says because it has little to do with our book, and we will not address his rather surprising attacks on our scholarship because the reader can readily verify their inaccuracy.)
Published Version: doi:10.1017/S0266267104001300
Other Sources: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0266267104001300
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12187121
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