Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards

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Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards

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Title: Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards
Author: Kaplow, Louis
Citation: Louis Kaplow, Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards, 24 RAND J. Econ. 625 (1993).
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Abstract: Shifting victorious plaintiffs' fees to defendants and increasing damage awards are alternative ways to achieve similar results: increasing plaintiffs' incentives to sue and raising defendants' expected payments. This article shows that relying on higher damage awards is more efficient than shifting plaintiffs' fees. The reason is that fee shifting is more valuable for plaintiffs with higher litigation costs. Thus, it is possible to substitute higher damage awards for fee shifting in a manner that leaves deterrence unaffected while eliminating the suits of plaintiffs with the highest litigation costs.
Published Version: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555749
Other Sources: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555749
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4263
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12206466
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