Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action
Author: Kaplow, Louis
Citation: Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 525 (1992).
Access Status: Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time (“dark deposit”). For more information on dark deposits, see our FAQ.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined using a model in which private insurance is available. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.
Published Version: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3440367
Other Sources: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3006
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12207432
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters