Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action
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Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 525 (1992).Abstract
A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined using a model in which private insurance is available. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.Other Sources
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3006Citable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12207432
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