Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
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Holland, Alisha Caroline. 2014. Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.Research Data
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/25844Abstract
Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAACitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12274631
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