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dc.contributor.authorSpamann, Holger
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-17T17:54:02Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationHolger Spamann, Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting, Harvard Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 730 (Sept. 10, 2012).en_US
dc.identifier.issn1936 - 5357en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12331809
dc.description.abstractThis paper exposits a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and derivatives in which a large trader can sometimes profitably acquire securities with their corporate control rights for the sole purpose of reducing the corporations value and gaining on a net short position created through off-setting derivatives. At other times, the large trader profitably takes a net long position. The large trader requires no private information beyond its own trades. The problem is most likely to manifest when derivatives trade on an exchange and transactions give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Businessen_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144552en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleDerivatives Trading and Negative Votingen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dash.depositing.authorSpamann, Holger
dc.date.available2014-06-17T17:54:02Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedSpamann, Holger


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