The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

 
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Author
Li, Fei
Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034
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Citation
Kotowski, Maciej H., and Fei Li. 2014. “The War of Attrition and the Revelation of Valuable Information.” Economics Letters (July). doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034.
Abstract
We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.
Citable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12559696

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