Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKotowski, Maciej Henryk
dc.contributor.authorLi, Fei
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-24T19:13:57Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationKotowski, Maciej H., and Fei Li. 2014. “The War of Attrition and the Revelation of Valuable Information.” Economics Letters (July). doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12559696
dc.description.abstractWe provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034en_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleThe war of attrition and the revelation of valuable informationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalEconomics Lettersen_US
dash.depositing.authorKotowski, Maciej Henryk
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034*
dash.contributor.affiliatedKotowski, Maciej


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record