Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem
Author: Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem, 121 Econ. Letters 390 (2013).
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.
Published Version: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513004230
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2282204
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Spier_754.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12967824
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters