Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.016Metadata
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Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem, 121 Econ. Letters 390 (2013).Abstract
Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.Other Sources
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2282204http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Spier_754.pdf
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