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dc.contributor.authorAshraf, Nava
dc.contributor.authorBandiera, Oriana
dc.contributor.authorLee, Scott Sang-Hyun
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-03T20:31:41Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationAshraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Scott S. Lee. "Awards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 100 (April 2014): 44–63.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13348076
dc.description.abstractOrganizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may affect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhancing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, we design a field experiment to unbundle these mechanisms. We find that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofDOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.001en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectstatus and positionen_US
dc.subjectperformance expectationsen_US
dc.subjectmotivation and incentivesen_US
dc.subjecthealthcare and treatmenten_US
dc.titleAwards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experimenten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dash.depositing.authorAshraf, Nava
dc.date.available2014-11-03T20:31:41Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.001*
dash.contributor.affiliatedLee, Scott
dash.contributor.affiliatedAshraf, Nava
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0002-0970-1941


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