Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

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Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

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Title: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
Author: Ashraf, Nava; Field, Erica; Lee, Jean

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Citation: Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review 104, no. 7 (July 2014).
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Abstract: We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19% less likely to seek family planning services, 25% less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27% percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable.
Published Version: doi:10.1257/aer.104.7.2210
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13348078
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