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dc.contributor.authorRamseyer, J. Mark
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-15T21:02:49Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.citationJ. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experiment, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1823 (1996).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0041-9907en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13623209
dc.description.abstractAny justification of strict products liability faces a problem: why should the law impose on private contracts made in competitive product markets what is effectively a mandatory insurance contract? Proponents of the current regime generally justify it by citing some mix of contracting costs, informational asymmetries, and (sometimes) consumer irrationality. The common implicit premise is that parties to ordinary consumer sales contracts would not, in an unregulated market, negotiate strict products liability by contract. In fact, over the past 20 years, manufacturers of a wide variety of products in Japan have voluntarily offered strict products liability protection by contract. In this article, I introduce the data on these contracts, and explore why some manufacturers (but not others) have found the contracts economically advantageous.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Pennsylvaniaen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol144/iss5/5/en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=10093en_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.titleProducts Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experimenten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalUniversity of Pennsylvania Law Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorRamseyer, J. Mark
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
workflow.legacycommentsDFen_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedRamseyer, John


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