Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy

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Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy

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Title: Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy
Author: Ramseyer, J. Mark; Kaplan, Steven N.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Steven N. Kaplan and J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 403 (1996).
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Abstract: We begin in Section II by discussing the modem theory of path dependence. In Section III, we trace the ties between that theory and the orthodox understanding of how Japanese firms behave. Then in Section IV, we report Steven Kaplan's recent empirical work on the actual behavior of Japanese firms. Finally, armed with the empirical results that contradict the orthodox view, in Section V we suggest how that view may have arisen.
Published Version: http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol74/iss2/6/
Other Sources: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10088
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13825028
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