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dc.contributor.authorChernenko, Sergey
dc.contributor.authorFoley, C. Fritz
dc.contributor.authorGreenwood, Robin Marc
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-19T19:46:47Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationChernenko, Sergey, C. Fritz Foley, and Robin Greenwood. "Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure." Financial Management 41, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 885–914.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0046-3892en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14010998
dc.description.abstractStandard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear all agency costs that they create and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We argue that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations may support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWiley Onlineen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01214.x/abstracten_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectbusiness and shareholder relationsen_US
dc.subjectownershipen_US
dc.subjectconflict of interestsen_US
dc.subjectinvestmenten_US
dc.subjectvaluationen_US
dc.titleAgency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structureen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalFinancial Managementen_US
dash.depositing.authorGreenwood, Robin Marc
dc.date.available2015-02-19T19:46:47Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01214.x/abstract*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFoley, C
dash.contributor.affiliatedGreenwood, Robin


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