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dc.contributor.authorLandau, David Evanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-03-18T13:10:12Z
dc.date.created2015-03en_US
dc.date.issued2014-12-04en_US
dc.date.submitted2015en_US
dc.identifier.citationLandau, David Evan. 2015. Beyond Judicial Independence: The Construction of Judicial Power in Colombia. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14226088
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation seeks to explain the behavior of one of the most activist high courts in the world, the Colombian Constitutional Court, since its creation in 1991. The standard approach within the field emphasizes political competition or fragmentation as an explanation for judicial independence. This literature tells a standard story about (1) the origins of independent constitutional courts, (2) the durability of those courts, and (3) their behavior. None of those stories accurately explain the Colombian case. Study of the antecedents of the Constitutional Court shows that the Court was not a case of “independence by design.” Instead, designers hoped to create a body that would be closer to the prevailing political regime than the existing Supreme Court. Judicial power in Colombia was built up over very long periods of time, and was based on judicial usefulness to prevailing political regimes, rather than its distance from those regimes. Further, the Court has constructed doctrinal tools to allow it to intervene across a wide range of areas and has used judicial decisions to cultivate the support of academics, civil society, and the middle class. It is the support of these groups, rather than political fragmentation, which has been decisive in shaping the Court and in protecting it from court-curbing and court-packing efforts. The ultimate test of the Court’s power was the aggressive attacks of the Uribe administration: the Court used its alliances to survive the threat posed by a popular and powerful president, and eventually managed to confront this administration by blocking a constitutional amendment that would likely have given President Uribe an unprecedented third term in office. In Colombia and beyond, focusing on the ways in which judiciaries are embedded into historical regime dynamics, and on the choices made by justices to carve out their own political space, can help to provide richer explanations for judicial behavior and more nuanced assessments of the effects of judicial activism.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dash.licenseLAAen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science, Generalen_US
dc.titleBeyond Judicial Independence: The Construction of Judicial Power in Colombiaen_US
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen_US
dash.depositing.authorLandau, David Evanen_US
dc.date.available2015-03-18T13:10:12Z
thesis.degree.date2015en_US
thesis.degree.grantorGraduate School of Arts & Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLevitsky, Stevenen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberTushnet, Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSkach, Cindyen_US
dc.type.materialtexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentGovernmenten_US
dash.identifier.vireohttp://etds.lib.harvard.edu/gsas/admin/view/73en_US
dc.description.keywordsColombia Constitutional Court; judicial independence; socio-economic rights; judicial poweren_US
dash.author.emaillandau@post.harvard.eduen_US
dash.identifier.drsurn-3:HUL.DRS.OBJECT:25119291en_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedLandau, David Evan


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