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dc.contributor.authorGersen, Jacob E.
dc.contributor.authorStephenson, Matthew Caleb
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-28T17:20:30Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationJacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. Legal Analysis 185 (2014).en_US
dc.identifier.issn2161-7201en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16073949
dc.description.abstractAlthough ensuring the “accountability” of agents to their principals is widely considered a core objective of institutional design, recent work in political economy has identified and elucidated an important class of situations in which effective accountability mechanisms can decrease, rather than increase, an agent’s likelihood of acting in her principal’s interests. The problem, which we call “over-accountability,” is essentially an information problem: sometimes even a fully rational but imperfectly informed principal (e.g., the citizens) will reward “bad” actions rather than “good” actions by an agent (e.g. the President). In these cases, not only do accountability mechanisms fail to remedy the agency problem inherent in representative government, they actually make the problem worse. This Article offers a conceptual and empirical overview of over-accountability problems, and also considers a range of potential solutions. By surveying both the distortions themselves and a range of possible responses, this article aspires to assist both public law scholars and institutional reformers in producing more effective solutions.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/185.full.pdf+htmlen_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1093/jla/lau008en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/2013PDFs/Over-Accountability%20-%20Oct%2018.pdfen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleOver-Accountabilityen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Legal Analysisen_US
dash.depositing.authorGersen, Jacob E.
dc.date.available2015-05-28T17:20:30Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedGersen, Jacob
dash.contributor.affiliatedStephenson, Matthew


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