Nudges, Agency, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics

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Nudges, Agency, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics

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Title: Nudges, Agency, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics
Author: Sunstein, Cass Robert
Citation: Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics, Rev. Phil. & Psychol., Special Issue on Nudges (forthcoming 2015).
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Abstract: This essay, for a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology, responds to ten papers that explore the uses and limits of nudges and choice architecture. The essay has three general themes. The first involves the objection that nudging threatens human agency. My basic response is that human agency is fully retained (because nudges do not compromise freedom of choice) and that agency is always exercised in the context of some kind of choice architecture. The second theme involves the importance of having a sufficiently capacious sense of the category of nudges, and a full appreciation of the differences among them. Some nudges either enlist or combat behavioral biases but others do not, and even among those that do enlist or combat such biases, there are significant differences. The third general theme is the need to bring various concerns (including ethical ones) in close contact with particular examples. A legitimate point about default rules may not apply to warnings or reminders. An ethical objection to the use of social norms may not apply to information disclosure. Here as elsewhere, abstraction can be a trap. We continue to learn about the relevant ethical issues, about likely public reactions to nudging, and about differences across cultures and nations. Future progress will depend on a high level of concreteness, perhaps especially in dealing with the vexing problem of time-inconsistency.
Other Sources: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577018
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16146531
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