dc.contributor.author | Bar-Gill, Oren | |
dc.contributor.author | Ben-Shahar, Omri | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-06-29T20:48:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. Legal Analysis 151 (2014). | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 2161-7201 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16883006 | |
dc.description.abstract | Exit from contract is one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals and keeping businesses honest. Yet consumers often choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks. This article examines the costs and benefits of free exit, as compared to the lock-in alternative. It argues that present regulation of exit penalties is poorly tailored to address concerns about lock-in, particularly in light of increasingly ubiquitous market-based solutions. The article also calls (regulatory) attention to loyalty rewards, which are shown to be as powerful as exit penalties, and equally detrimental. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jla/lau003 | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | Exit from Contract | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
dc.description.version | Version of Record | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Journal of Legal Analysis | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Bar-Gill, Oren | |
dc.date.available | 2015-06-29T20:48:09Z | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/jla/lau003 | * |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Bar-Gill, Oren | |