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dc.contributor.authorBar-Gill, Oren
dc.contributor.authorBen-Shahar, Omri
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-29T20:48:09Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationOren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. Legal Analysis 151 (2014).en_US
dc.identifier.issn2161-7201en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16883006
dc.description.abstractExit from contract is one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals and keeping businesses honest. Yet consumers often choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks. This article examines the costs and benefits of free exit, as compared to the lock-in alternative. It argues that present regulation of exit penalties is poorly tailored to address concerns about lock-in, particularly in light of increasingly ubiquitous market-based solutions. The article also calls (regulatory) attention to loyalty rewards, which are shown to be as powerful as exit penalties, and equally detrimental.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jla/lau003en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleExit from Contracten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Legal Analysisen_US
dash.depositing.authorBar-Gill, Oren
dc.date.available2015-06-29T20:48:09Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jla/lau003*
workflow.legacycomments"This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited."en_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedBar-Gill, Oren


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