A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation

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A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation

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Title: A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation
Author: Shavell, Steven
Citation: Steven Shavell, A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 13 (2015).
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Abstract: The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is — implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.11.005
Other Sources: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534579
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17367410
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