Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China–X-Ray Equipment Dispute

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Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China–X-Ray Equipment Dispute

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Title: Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China–X-Ray Equipment Dispute
Author: Wu, Mark; Moore, Michael

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Citation: Mark Wu & Michael Moore, Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China–X-Ray Equipment Dispute, 14 World Trade Rev. 239 (2015).
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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between antidumping duties and strategic industrial policy. We argue that the dynamic between the two instruments is more complex and elaborate than that offered by the conventional account. We use the recent China–X-Ray Equipment dispute as a case study to show that linkage between the two instruments may not be the consequence of a government-led policy but instead a result of firm-driven responses to an industrial policy. This in turn may lead to antidumping tit-for-tat behavior between WTO members. We also analyze how WTO litigation serves as a means to alter the payoff and discuss the implications and unresolved questions that remain following the China–X-Ray Equipment ruling by the WTO.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474745615000038
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17367413
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