A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering

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A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering

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Title: A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering
Author: Weitzman, Martin L.
Citation: Weitzman, Martin L. 2015. A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineerin. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1049-1068.
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Abstract: Abating climate change is an enormous international public goods problem with a classical "free rider" structure. But it is also a global "free driver" problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This exploratory paper develops the main features of a
"free driver" externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties.
Published Version: 10.1111/sjoe.12120
Other Sources: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/weitzman/files/voting.architecture.free_.driver.v2_1.8.14.pdf
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18622.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17368469
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