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dc.contributor.advisorJones, Russellen_US
dc.contributor.advisorStriker, Giselaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSimmons, Alisonen_US
dc.contributor.advisorGill, Mary Louiseen_US
dc.contributor.authorGasser, Marcen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-17T17:39:51Z
dc.date.created2015-05en_US
dc.date.issued2015-04-28en_US
dc.date.submitted2015en_US
dc.identifier.citationGasser, Marc. 2015. On Perception's Role in Aristotle’s Epistemology. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467304
dc.description.abstractAristotle thinks all our knowledge comes from perception. Yet he doesn't say much about the sense in which our knowledge might be based on or derived from the things we perceive. So what exactly does perception contribute to the more advanced cognitive states that make up our intellectual lives, and how should we understand the nature of its contribution? I argue that perception contributes to these more advanced states by putting us in touch with particular things in a way that's responsive to the universals governing their behavior: perceptible particulars possess certain features because they instantiate certain universals, and perception allows us to discriminate these features and experience them as action-guiding aspects of our environment. So for instance, a patient might exhibit feverish features because she instantiates malarial disease, and a doctor might perceive these feverish features and experience them as soliciting some course of action---as soliciting that the patient be leeched, say. I explain how perception, so understood, can serve as a basis for the development of a perceptually driven form of practical knowledge (ἐμπειρία); roughly, the form of knowledge possessed by a doctor who knows how to cure a range of patients but could not explain why or how her treatments work. I then explain how such practical knowledge can itself serve as a basis for the theoretically sophisticated grasp of universals Aristotle takes as his cognitive ideal.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPhilosophyen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dash.licenseLAAen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleOn Perception's Role in Aristotle’s Epistemologyen_US
dc.typeThesis or Dissertationen_US
dash.depositing.authorGasser, Marcen_US
dc.date.available2015-07-17T17:39:51Z
thesis.degree.date2015en_US
thesis.degree.grantorGraduate School of Arts & Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.type.materialtexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dash.identifier.vireohttp://etds.lib.harvard.edu/gsas/admin/view/236en_US
dc.description.keywordsAristotle;perceptionen_US
dash.author.emailmgasser@gmail.comen_US
dash.identifier.drsurn-3:HUL.DRS.OBJECT:25164559en_US
dash.contributor.affiliatedGasser, Marc


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