A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation
CitationSteven Shavell, A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series Discussion Paper No. 802, Dec. 2014, 42 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 13 (2015)).
AbstractThe deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is—implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17916455
- HLS Scholarly Articles