Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination 

      Ma, Hongyao; Meir, Reshef; Parkes, David C.; Zou, James (2015)
      In this extended abstract, we consider simple coordination problems, such as allocating the right to use a shared sports facility in a way that maximizes its usage, or picking the time of a meeting in a way that maximizes ...
    • Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response 

      Ma, Hongyao; Robu, Valentin; Li, Na; Parkes, David C. (2016)
      We study the problem of incentivizing reliable demand-response in modern electricity grids. Each agent is uncertain about her future ability to reduce demand and unreliable. Agents who choose to participate in a demand-response ...
    • Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities 

      Ma, Hongyao; Meir, Reshef; Parkes, David C. (2016)
      The existence of truthful social choice mechanisms strongly depends on whether monetary transfers are allowed. Without payments there are no truthful, non-dictatorial mechanisms under mild requirements, whereas the VCG ...