Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations
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Brown, Jennifer, and Dylan Minor. "Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-022, August 2015Abstract
We examine misconduct in financial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm’s brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data for insurance agents, we find that agents working exclusively for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of justified sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.Terms of Use
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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:21150405
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