An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms

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An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms

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Title: An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms
Author: Lambert, Nicolas S.; Langford, John; Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer; Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Shoham, Yoav; Pennock, David M.

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Citation: Lambert, Nicolas S., John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham, and David M. Pennock. 2015. “An Axiomatic Characterization of Wagering Mechanisms.” Journal of Economic Theory 156 (March): 389–416. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.012.
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Abstract: We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to the actions of others. We show how our mechanism, called the Brier betting mechanism, arises naturally from a modified parimutuel betting market. We prove that it is essentially the unique wagering mechanism that is anonymous, proportional, sybilproof, and homogeneous. While the Brier betting mechanism is designed for individuals with immutable beliefs, we find that it continues to perform well even for Bayesian individuals who learn from the actions of others.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.012
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