Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

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Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

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Title: Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay
Author: Hernandez, Pablo; Minor, Dylan Blu; Sisak, Dana

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Hernandez, Pablo, Dylan B. Minor, and Dana Sisak. "Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-040, October 2015.
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Abstract: We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance.
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Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23492319
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