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dc.contributor.authorHernandez, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorMinor, Dylan Blu
dc.contributor.authorSisak, Dana
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-04T15:38:39Z
dc.date.issued2015-11-04
dc.identifier.citationHernandez, Pablo, Dylan B. Minor, and Dana Sisak. "Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-040, October 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23492319
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleDo People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Payen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Buusiness School working paper series # 16-040en_US
dash.depositing.authorMinor, Dylan Blu
dc.date.available2015-11-04T15:38:39Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedMinor, Dylan Blu


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