Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

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Title: Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Author: Ünver, M. Utku; Sönmez, Tayfun; Roth, Alvin

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Citation: Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. 2007. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences. American Economic Review 97(3): 828-851.
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Abstract: Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a “double coincidence of wants.” Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
Published Version: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.3.828
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2562809
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