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dc.contributor.authorAnderson, Robert M.
dc.contributor.authorEllison, Glenn
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-27T18:03:19Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationAnderson, Robert M., Glenn Ellison, and Drew Fudenberg. 2010. “Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents.” Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 1: 2–23. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.009.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27755298
dc.description.abstractConsider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers” and “sellers”: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that two markets of very different sizes can co-exist even if larger markets are more efficient. This extends the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg [2003. Quart. J. Econ. 118, 1249–1278], who ignored the constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market should be an integer, and instead analyzed the “quasi-equilibria” where agents are treated as infinitely divisible.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.009en_US
dash.licenseMETA_ONLY
dc.subjectAgglomerationen_US
dc.subjectTwo-sided marketsen_US
dc.subjectQuasi-equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectTippingen_US
dc.subjectLarge finite economiesen_US
dc.subjectIndivisibilityen_US
dc.subjectIndivisibilityen_US
dc.titleLocation choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agentsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionVersion of Recorden_US
dc.relation.journalGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dash.embargo.until10000-01-01
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.009*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew


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