Old and Young Politicians

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Old and Young Politicians

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Title: Old and Young Politicians
Author: Alesina, Alberto Francesco; Troiano, Ugo; Cassidy, Traviss

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Citation: Alesina, Alberto, Ugo Troiano, and Traviss Cassidy. 2015. Old and Young Politicians. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
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Abstract: We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.
Other Sources: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alesina/files/old_and_young_politicians.pdf?m=1423854215
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27768984
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