Old and Young Politicians
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CitationAlesina, Alberto, Ugo Troiano, and Traviss Cassidy. 2015. Old and Young Politicians. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
AbstractWe evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27768984
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