dc.contributor.author | Alesina, Alberto Francesco | |
dc.contributor.author | Troiano, Ugo | |
dc.contributor.author | Cassidy, Traviss | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-29T20:21:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Alesina, Alberto, Ugo Troiano, and Traviss Cassidy. 2015. Old and Young Politicians. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27768984 | |
dc.description.abstract | We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economics | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alesina/files/old_and_young_politicians.pdf?m=1423854215 | en_US |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://www.nber.org/papers/w20977 | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.subject | politicians | en_US |
dc.subject | age | en_US |
dc.subject | regression discontinuity | en_US |
dc.title | Old and Young Politicians | en_US |
dc.type | Research Paper or Report | en_US |
dc.description.version | Author's Original | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Alesina, Alberto Francesco | |
dc.date.available | 2016-07-29T20:21:26Z | |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Troiano, Ugo | |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Alesina, Alberto | |