Conscription as Regulation

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Conscription as Regulation

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Title: Conscription as Regulation
Author: Mulligan, C. B.; Shleifer, Andrei

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Mulligan, C. B. and Andrei Sheifer. 2005. Conscription as Regulation. American Law and Economics Review 7 (1): 85–111. doi:10.1093/aler/ahi009.
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Abstract: We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the draft as a deterrent to its use. We find that, holding the relative size of the military constant, higher population countries are more likely to use the draft. We also find that French legal origin countries, which we see as facing lower fixed and variable administrative costs, are more likely to draft than are common law countries. Conscription does not seem to be influenced by democracy, and is influenced by the deadweight costs of taxation only in countries with very large militaries. The results suggest that fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations may be an important determinant of their use.
Published Version: doi:10.1093/aler/ahi009
Other Sources: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10558
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27867136
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