Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors

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Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors

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Title: Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors
Author: Li, Feng; Srinivasan, Suraj

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Citation: Li, Feng, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors." Journal of Financial Economics 102, no. 2 (November 2011): 454–469.
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Abstract: We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average U.S. board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms.
Published Version: 10.2139/ssrn.1014157
Other Sources: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663905
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:29660922
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