Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism
Author: Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Chotibut, Thiparat, and David R. Nelson. 2015. “Evolutionary Dynamics with Fluctuating Population Sizes and Strong Mutualism.” Physical Review E 92 (2) (August 20). doi:10.1103/physreve.92.022718.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.
Published Version: doi:doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.92.022718
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30168444
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters