Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKhan, Mozaffar
dc.contributor.authorSrinivasan, Suraj
dc.contributor.authorTan, Liang
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-07T17:16:07Z
dc.date.issued2017-02-07
dc.identifier.citationKhan, Mozaffar N., Suraj Srinivasan, and Liang Tan. "Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence." Accounting Review (forthcoming).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0001-4826en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30203358
dc.description.abstractWe provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, as well as a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51529en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2779809en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectprivate ownershipen_US
dc.subjectcrime and corruptionen_US
dc.subjecttaxationen_US
dc.subjectagency theoryen_US
dc.titleInstitutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalAccounting Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorSrinivasan, Suraj
dc.date.available2017-02-07T17:16:07Z
dc.identifier.doi10.2308/accr-51529*
dash.contributor.affiliatedKhan, Mozaffar
dash.contributor.affiliatedSrinivasan, Suraj


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record