Competing Auctions

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Competing Auctions

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Title: Competing Auctions
Author: Mobius, Markus; Fudenberg, Drew; Ellison, Glenn

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Ellison, Glen, Drew Fudenberg and Markus M. Mobius. 2004. Competing auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association 2(1): 30-66.
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Abstract: This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer—seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/154247604323015472
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3043414
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